In the December issue 2010 of Foreign Affairs the chair and CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt and the Director of Google ideas, Jared Cohen, declared that "the advent and power of connection technologies (…) will make the 21 st century all about surprises. Governments will be caught off-guard when large numbers of their citizens, armed with virtually nothing but cell phones, take part in mini-rebellions that challenge their authority". 1 The democratization of communications, the theory goes, will bring about the democratization of the world. This vision, and the rhetoric it feeds on, seems to have been supported by plenty of evidence:
Add to this, new practices such as sns-collected smart-mobs, sms-gathered participatory budgeting, circumvention methods protecting netizens' anonymity such as the free software Tor, as well as the fact that the net provides low cost pretty safe ICTs (skype is notoriously hard to wiretap), thus the higher risks authoritarian regimes might need to take in perpetrating repression, the relative ease in accessing non-government controlled media (the 2011 Italian referenda have been praised in these terms), let alone the hope many have in seeing flash mobs and web 2.0 apps transform undecided subjects into active protesters -following the connection between informational cascades and what Susanne Lohmann viewed as peer pressure in pulling down the Berlin wall 4 -all this, and more, make for an undiscriminating halleluiah that, in some ways, recall similarly overenthusiastic hopes following the "third wave" of democratization, named after Samuel Huntington's 1991 best-seller.
In February 2011, Manuel Castells -who wrote the famous information era-trilogy that turned out to be an eye-opener for many social scientists in the "networked society" 5 -claimed: "these popular insurrections in the Arab world constitute a turning point in the social and political history of humanity. And perhaps the most important of the internet-led and facilitated changes in all aspects of life, society, the economy and culture. And this is just the 2 The "Great firewall" is the system of filters and re-routers, detours and dead-ends designed through TRS technologies to keep Chinese Internet users on the state-approved online path and the 50 cent party, an army of online commentators that are paid so much for their posts promoting the CCP); both phenomena are usually presented as a quasi-Orwellian cyberspace control. start" 6 . This is consistent with his overall claim that "the process of formation and exercise of power relationships is decisively transformed in the new organisational and technological context derived from the rise of global digital networks of communication as the fundamental symbol-processing system of our time". 7 By a similar token, Milad Doueihi, an analyst of digital cultures, sees that "la culture numérique est porteuse de changement radical (…). La
Tunisie comme l'Egypte symbolisent ce changement porté par le numérique: quelques noms propres, un lieu et la foule". 8 A fine observer of our time with the Frankfurt School's interest for techniques, Jürgen Habermas prognosticated that "the Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public", even though he also pointed out that "the web can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics". to the power of the state and therefore is largely impotent as a mechanism for promoting democracy. He shows that, throughout the world, the Internet is (a) more likely to be used for entertainment purposes or as a global shopping mall (e.g. the current angry birds mania), (b) censored in ways that are not easily surmountable (e.g. arrest and detainment of cyberdissidents), (c) used as a tool for propaganda (e.g. China's 50 cent party or Hugo Chavez's turn over from netcensor to famous twitter), and (d) used for spying on dissidents: in Belorussia, for instance, the authorities started surveilling By_mob where the community LiveJournal announced its meetings: not only did the Police arrest the demonstrators, but pictures were taken of the people present so they could be easily spotted on social media; in the "Twitter revolution" dissidents discussed relatively freely on Goodreads, away from their censors, until the Los Angeles Times published an article on the phenomenon. Authoritarian states learn pretty quickly and Iranian communications officials anonymously created websites encouraging people to post pictures of the protests so they could identify, track and, sometimes, detain the protesters.
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The aim of this paper is not to fuel the enthusiasm of those who see a new form of democracy burgeoning, nor to take the conservative stance sub soli nihil novi or drop the realist remark that technology does not only change the world but, as in all feedback loops, "the world is changing internet". 14 Rather, this paper will outline how we can possibly address in problematically fertile terms the question of "what does e add to democracy?"
II. E-democracy between Science, Technology and Politics
I will start by stressing that for e-democracy to be an interesting problem for philosophical enquiry it needs to constitute a problem (i) rich in consequences, (ii) clearly defined and/or definable, (iii) accessible, in the meaning easy to understand but hard to solve, (iv) intrinsically open, leaving disagreement as a viable option. This paper shall evidently not transform the topic, which is still something of a moving target, into such a well-defined problem of philosophical enquiry since such a task goes well beyond the purposes of an introductory workshop but, at least, I shall attempt to draw a conceptual map of questions that need to be addressed -or better, of clusters of micro-problems -and that cannot be easily articulated unless we take the "e" of democracy seriously.
Moreover, a word on democracy as a form of government is needed. It has over the ages been associated with a variety of adjectives: direct, representative, procedural, formal, connected to e-democracy even though not equal to its institutional manifestations (e.g. Eparliament, E-government etc.), such as first and foremost an accessible, non-censured and neutral web.
Let us start by two observations that do not seem to have been properly connected hitherto: the first concerns technology and the second politics.
The first observation is nicely presented with a quote by the father of cybernetics, Norbert Weiner: "It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-rapid computing machine was in principle an ideal central nervous system to an apparatus for automatic control (…).
Long before Nagasaki and the public awareness of the atomic bomb, it had occurred to me that we were here in the presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of importance for To rephrase it, technological information has a semantic dimension, involving "giving and making sense" of "reality". Information as semantic content can be seen as the upper level of the technological complex that marks our age. 28 Epistemologically, "information" however does not mean "belief" nor "knowledge", yet it is distinguishable from mere data, the uninterpreted differences of symbols or signs. Ontologically, "information is information, information is well-formed, meaningful and truthful data". 30 This semantic dimension of technology should keep us from falling flatly into the widespread belief that technology is a means to the service of human ends, a form of passive universe of "objects" whose functions and purposes are shaped by the pursuits of humans in the contexts where they occur.
"Artefacts qua means are never neutral. They make some things possible and exclude others.
Artefacts embody values or 'have politics' (…). Technology is not exogenous to human agency, as the contrast of humans to machines may initially suggest. Technology does not constitute a force that simply has to be used, resisted, bypassed or altogether avoided".
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Today, there is of course a burgeoning contemporary literature on e-democracy but it can be distinguished from previous strains of research because, most of the time, it uses, at some level of analysis, the idea that the technology we are dealing with should be understood and grasped in terms of "information", not mere tools. 32 Our starting point, thus, is that "the modern alliance between sophia and techne has reached a new level of synergy with the computer revolution".
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III. Mapping problems: what is new and what is not?
I suggest the following non-exhaustive map of problems that are implied by the term edemocracy in today's debate. I shall try to spell out the relations of political thinking with its "cousins", the other branches of practical thought. A cascade of issues, associated with edemocracy in its broadly construed meaning, will be stressed and assigned to respective levels of change. Some are partially convergent, yet most dissimilar. All push for reconsideration of the contemporary dialectic between means and ends. 32 The difference between a tool or instrument and a machine consists in the difference of reliance on individually taken decisions: «A decision is required at every moment, the instrument being manipulated in different ways in accordance with the result so far attained. Such decisions may be vested in the instrument itself. If it is, the instrument then attains the status of a machine. If the user makes all the decisions the instrument is only a tool. The distinction between a tool and a machine is primarily that in the former a decision is involved at every moment and in the latter there is an independent functioning which permits the decision to be made by the natural run of the instrument» (Peter Weiss, An Introduction to , and, normatively, such accounts appropriately recommends stocktaking on past experiences. Yet the inherent risk with such outlooks is that they may overstretch the principle of analogy, suggesting a mechanical process of extending knowledge and thus obscuring important decisions that are being taken in the design of new technologies that will be used in operating within the "politically loaded" world of experience.
Under (b), we should keep separate two positions that share, contrarily to positions under (a), the idea that computers have such an impact on the political relationships of human beings so as to warrant independent investigation of the "uniqueness" of political cyberspace and democracy in the digital age. Those who call for such independent investigation, nevertheless, develop different perspectives: the first (b1) focuses on the "transformation" brought on by digitalisation while the second (b2) concentrates on the "revolution" going on.
Just as the information age of the "interconnected estate" has impacted on other branches of practical thought, such as ethics, economics and the law, the outlook under (b1) holds that we are witnessing new versions of old problems, and the novelty does not only consist in recontextualization but in the fact that the issue raises unprecedented or unique features.
The difference between positions under (a2) and (b1) can thus be spelled out: whereas (a2) claims that we are witnessing new versions of old problems, yet refuses to treat these problems as offering unique features, (b1) claims that not only are we confronted with novel questions but we could not correctly understand and respond to these challenges if we do not take into account the specificities of information technology (such as its malleability, ubiquity, easily scalable networks, the "long tail", the emergence of collective intelligence, velocity of transformation or "Moore's law" etc. revolutionary, but it means that "business as usual" has to take into account the new setting.
On the political side, this trend was picked up by the transition to e-government in public administrations (e.g. electronic service delivery, the development of standardized management tools for legal documentation and information retrieval, such as XML standards;
ZTTs in surveillance and congestion management; smart cards in public transport such as the London Oystercard): "the advent of the digital era is now the most general, pervasive, and structurally distinctive influence on how governance arrangements are changing in advanced industrialized states". 43 E-government streamlines, standardizes, and modifies public administrations but does not pretend to create e-democracy ex novo.
The transformative potential of the Internet also hit lawyers, prompted by the appearance of new "computer crimes" and the avalanche of law-making from the mid-90ies onwards potential of the digital age was firmly grasped and new ways of tackling the updated versions of traditional ethical, economic and legal issues quickly developed.
IV. How has the transformation hit the political realm?
Today the transformative potential of information technology appears when we consider problems of how we should best update realms of political theory with lengthy histories, such as (c1) fundamental rights, (c2) institutionalized power, foremost that of the State; (c3) political participation, including parties, movements etc.; (c4) citizen education, including socialization practices of political relevance (e.g. consent-formation, political identification practices…). All have, at some level of abstraction, a connection to (e)-democracy. "One of the weaknesses of Internet studies is a failure to link research to existing literatures or place it within current political contexts". 44 This implies that both futuristic optimists and realist normalizers fail to highlight that, under the present circumstances, some political institutions might benefit while other might not, some communicational settings may act as a catalyst for integrating some ICTs into participation and some may not. Scales of grey matter nonetheless.
Here I shall briefly highlight some of the questions that can be raised in relation to points mentioned.
Get the Balance Right
In relation to fundamental rights (c1) the digital age has changed profoundly the ways in which we balance relative fundamental rights against each other: Think about freedom of speech and privacy. It is becoming all the more evident that, once we enter the infosphere, the traditional habeas corpus, to be able to offer the guarantees, safeguards and liberties we expect from it, needs to be understood (in addition and beyond the traditional approach) in terms of habeas data. 45 In other words, in a world where YouTube serves 2 billion videos a day, Twitter registers 750 twits a second, and 2.5 billion photos are being posted on FB a month, the balancing of freedom of speech and privacy has changed substantially: in accordance with (a2), privacy has not ceased to be the "right to be let alone" in the meaning of the right to non-intromission (e.g. secrecy of correspondence and of one's home), but it has also assumed a previously unknown meaning of a right to control over the treatment of personal data. How much intentionality can be legitimately read into "like"-ing? How does the notion of "informed consent" change in such a setting? Such issues have become urgent with the use of data mining techniques that enable sns to "treat" such quantities of data as to allow statistical retrieval of unreleased information: "non-sensible data" such as your zip code for instance 
Transformations to the State and Institutions
In relation to (c2), the power of institutions, and in particular of the State, is changing. On one hand, some of the changes we are witnessing are transformative but hardly related to ICTs, on other hand, some other trends, related to ICTs are unprecedented.
As far as the first are concerned, there are a series of transformative trends that may perhaps be amplified by the Internet but that are not "new"; e.g. there is of course the longstanding tradition in political theory that over the 20 th century focused on the transformations of the state and the erosion of the Westphalia paradigm. Most tendencies of state erosion might be amplified but cannot be said to be "unprecedented" as such. Perhaps it is true that "in the interconnected estate, a virtual space that is constrained by different national laws but not national boundaries, there can be no equivalent to the Treaty of Westphalia". 47 Yet political theory has been reflecting on this tendency of erosion of the public/private, in/outdivides for decades. And there is, indeed, food for thought on the topic: A good example of the kind of post-statual blurring of genres that cannot find easy accommodation in traditional frameworks is the GNI -Global Network Initiative -that brings together human rights groups, investors, academics and companies and has published specific guidelines on promoting freedom of expression. Another interesting case of a private company having a (para)public function is the ICANN that distribute domain names among other things. 48 Many more cases could be cited. Add to this, phenomena such as the outsourcing of censure from governments to ISPs, partly as a consequence of the gatekeeping role exercised by some key players, such as Google for instance: This, in turn, opens up questions such as does holding intermediaries liable for the content disseminated by their users lead to self-protective and over-broad private censorship without the due process of the law? OpenNet lists the attempts of censuring the Net that have no basis in judiciary rulings (U.N. guidelines to defend free expression claim censorship of content online must be transparent and enforced only through the courts). These are pressing issues but could be framed within the trend that investigates how the lines of private and public are getting increasingly blurred: the digital environment might just strengthen an already existing trend. Many empirical scholars in political science have argued that we are assisting to enforcement of previous trends: early evidence of eparticipation indicated "a deepening of activism among the already engaged, but only a marginal mobilization role in relation to new audiences. Overall, ICTs seem to be accelerating some of the trends of the pre-internet era such as individualization and disaggregation". 49 On such a reading, the Internet does not much more than accelerate trends that brought on "postdemocracy", 50 e.g. fall in party and trade union membership, the lack of satisfaction with traditional parties and the rise of so-called protest business, 51 an increasing focus on singleissue campaigns, ephemeral mobilization practices. These problems of "mature democracies"
have roots in the pre-digital age and "the arrival of the internet into the midst of these upheavals has added a further layer to debates about the role of political organizations". 52 The early days that stressed the risks of electronic populism 53 did not discover something new but rather added a dose of tech-determinism to the already on-going sufferings of representative democracy.
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Conversely, we are also assisting to trends that embody the truly transformative potential there was a clear distinction between agent and subject of surveillance; it was generally noncooperative; visible, manifest and usually coercive; it was more fragmented; whereas today it is carried out by ICTs, the watcher/watched relation is blurred (e.g. self-surveillance and cooperative surveillance), it has low visibility in disguised and routinized monitoring of 
Transformations to participation and its prerequisites
In relation to (c3) -political participation and processes of formation of consent and dissent through parties and movements -we need to rethink basic aspects of mobilization, informational pluralism, dynamics of public opinion, structure of the public sphere etc.
Empirical work on e-participation still disagrees on the benefic vs. malefic impacts of ICTs:
on the one hand some see participation increasing and deliberation potentially improve decisions, 58 others warn that it might be dangerous.
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As social theory was discovering that being virtual is an extension of time-space distanciation, whereby relations between social actors are increasingly disembedded -i.e. one of the most conspicuous characteristics of late modernity that gives rise to a range of highly significant social reconfigurations -we still ignore how ICTs are impacting the political side of this virtuality. In the only entry dedicated to the digital age of Marc Bevir's recent
Encyclopedia of Political Theory, namely "Virtual", Stephen Coleman stresses that "it is unwise to think of virtuality in a politically deterministic way. That is to say, being virtual neither empowers nor weakens citizens; it neither broadens nor constrains public spheres. (…)
In some situations, it allows people to engage in more meaningful communications that usually end up in a more extreme position (…). Group polarization is a typical phenomenon in deliberating groups». 62 An interesting case study here would perhaps be Finland: Can the hyper-connectivity of the country that first constitutionalized access to broad band be correlated to polarization in politics, with the recent nationalistic upswing in the last elections?
A part from polarization, cocooning is another issue, i.e. the fact that people entrench into closed circles of political information where citizens can easily filter out news of certain kinds, an inclination due foremost to preference for avoiding "cognitive dissonance": it is not per se a new problem but ICTs enhance the effect by picking and choosing sources of information more freely in a panorama of more fragmented media where "trust" is bound to become a central epistemic value 63 and perhaps also key to understanding political orientation. In a world where more than 50% of the world's population has access to some combination of ICTs (5 billion cell-phone users, around 2 billion internet users, some 6,7% of the world's population having private access to the web) another problem for public opinion is the long-term effects of unrestrained gossip on the democratic system that tend to make false rumours go viral. 64 of mistrust in experts that is often associated with the faith in crowed-sourced wisdom. 66 The open source pioneer Eric Raymond, for instance, has raised concerns about Wikipedia being "disastrous" from such a standpoint: According to Raymond, open source is not applicable to an encyclopaedia, as highlighted by the introduction of Wiki's 5 robots protecting entries against the obscenities and mass deletion of wikitrolls, the semi-closure of certain entries such as God, Al Gore, Galileo and Chopin, notwithstanding the "success story" that Nature published in 2005 finding a 4:3 error ratio between Wikipedia and the British encyclopaedia.
Linked to potential changes in the structure and dynamics of public opinion we find the changes in the public sphere that ICTs induce and that social and political theory is currently tracking: the Internet is often presented as a potential public sphere. Building on John B.
Thompson's theoretical account of mediatisation as a process whereby "the exchange of symbolic forms is no longer restricted primarily to the contexts of face-to-face interaction, but is extensively and increasingly mediated by the institutions and mechanisms of mass communication", 67 some scholars have argued that social membership is increasingly taking a virtual form, for example, in online social movements and communities, and enabled relationships between governments and citizens. This was the ground for the rise of the "Netizen" in the 90ies as a "virtual citizen". It is noteworthy that unlike "virtual representation" in traditional political theory, which sought to justify the absence of people from power by characterizing them as virtually spoken for, Internet-related virtuality tend to be employed as a way of enhancing participation, by characterizing citizens as virtually spoken with.
The changes in the public sphere call for better understanding: at the same time public opinion appears to be divided (polarized, segmented, fragmented etc.) and empowered. One transformative (and understudied) aspect of participation is the increased support from expat communities ("virtual overseas party branches"), a direct impact of global diasporas using ICTs. Another challenge at this level of analysis (c.3) is to design mobilization procedures adapted to inforgs. It is often stressed that online donors tend to be "middle-class, fairly well educated and politically active": 68 How do you design mobilization procedures adapted to politically inactive inforgs? In the early 2000's it was often stressed that online campaigning would only attract the least participative age group: How is it when the digital natives grow older? "Across Europe to date [we face a] reinforcement rather than a mobilization story".
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There is considerable scope to analyse how and why online recruitment fails or succeeds.
Transformations to citizen education: redesigning net etiquette?
In relation to (c4) -citizen education -we need to rethink the "skill reset" that ICTs are prompting. Citizen education has appeared for some time to be a promise that traditional democratic theory had not kept: 70 While democrats typically believe that the practice of democracy modifies the ability of citizens to choose, making them do better choices, reality Other citizen education-related issues likely to gain from being framed into the transformative dimension of e-democracy are the following (they are not entirely novel, and stocktaking from previous experiences can be valuable to set up guidelines): Whereas there is a longstanding tradition concerning journalistic behaviour, there is no established net etiquette for people blogging on political matters. It is common in the US that bloggers advocate for a campaign? Similar issues concern bloggers' potentially abusive language and its connection to the abovementioned suggestion to decriminalize defamation. Another politically salient issue here is the management of "collective memory" on the web. On the individual level, old posts create a problem of claiming, enjoying and enforcing a "right to oblivion" but on the collective level this implies a problem about having a "right to change one's mind": a politician caught off guard in one moment in time expressing contradicting views to current ideas is likely to be targeted: how are ICTs changing such situations?
Yet another problem that calls on digital educational measures adapted to the new situation concerns anonymity and encryption practices. The ICT revolution, it is often said, has a megaphone multiplier effect, which need not amplify just what we "like". Jaron Lanier in You are not a Gadget argued that anonymity provided by the Internet can promote a sadist culture. 73 On the one hand, we see phenomena of individual "sadism" such as the "humanflesh search" in China, denounced on the NYT Magazine 2010 by Tom Downey, i.e. a kind of crowed-sourced detective work where people find and hunt down enemies in corrupt officials or simply people who have made others angry. On the other hand, encryption make mafia's and terrorist networks thrive: "as relatively inexpensive encryption technology continues to proliferate on the commercial market, there is little doubt that autocrats and hackers will make use of it, too. Finding the balance between protecting dissidents and enabling criminals will be difficult at best". 74 Balancing accountability against anonymization will need civic engagement and make education more important on the democratic agenda and redesign our ways of viewing "acceptable" anonymity.
Last but not least, a politically relevant aspect of the digital age and its specific forms of interaction is how the repertoire of civil disobedience is changing. The non-violent movement has developed alternative strategies to violence even since it first appeared (e.g. boycotts, sit- 
V. Where lies the revolutionary thrust?
Let us now go back to the cousins of political philosophy so as to better grasp what in the current state-of-the-art concerning e-democracy really signals novelty. As the transformative dimension pushes for a still on-going process of updating, a further step is being taken in many fields of practical relevance. I shall refer to this shift of perspective, or awakening to the uniqueness of the technology impacting our world, as the "revolutionary" thrust. The idea is that information technology leaves some things as they were, and changes others to such an extent that previously received wisdom is of little practical use in developing plausible answerers to the upcoming challenges, but ICTs also increasingly entail a list of unheard-of problems that we are not culturally and scientifically prepared to address and that therefore The rights are not seldom presented as those of the software, not of traditional agents. This leaves room for plenty of debates but it clearly changes our moral toolkit drastically.
In economics, the "revolutionary" aspect of ICTs appeared in relation to the long tail, i.e.
the retailing strategy of selling a large number of rarely required items in relatively small quantities -usually in addition to selling fewer popular items in large quantities. To
Anderson, examples of such long tails include Amazon and Netflix. 77 We could add iTunes etc. Because of the negligible stocking, inventory and distribution costs of digital copies, such business models realize significant profit out of selling small volumes of hard-to-find items to many customers instead of only selling large volumes of a reduced number of popular items.
Given enough choice, customers change their selection and buying patterns so as to result in the demand across products having a power law distribution or Pareto distribution. One innovatory consequence is the radically different capitalization processes. 78 Moreover, economics discovered the "revolutionary" implications of ICTs with the emergence of decentralized non-market based transitional framework that compete with traditional forms of exchange; e.g. new forms of competition include the P2P collaboration groups that produce open-source software or create wikis, but also the crowdsourcing model, in which a company outsources work to a large group of market players using a collaborative online platform, and more generally work performed by individuals in commons-like networks that enable a "system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on market strategies". 79 This economic dimension, it should not be forgotten, is strictly linked to the emergence of the web 2.0 that is today at the center of the discussions on e-democracy. 80 Yet, the analysis of the specifically political dimension of the impact of this technology is still largely unexplored, which might seem all the more surprising since the Internet has a structure that per se promotes informative pluralism since it enjoys a "variable geometry" (to use a fashionable expression in EU studies): contrarily to one-to-many or point-to-point media as traditional broadcast and publishing, the Internet enables many-to-many communication (e.g. FB), one-to-one communication (e.g. e-agenda), many-to-one (e.g. mail). It also has an interactive capability unlike traditional "passivity-promoting" media. Add to this the lowering of entry costs into the discussion that stimulated the rise of UGC (User generated content). Finally, it is a decentralized or a-cephalous media, contrarily to traditional media: conceived an as anarchical space, there is no hierarchy among flows -every bit has the same "value" on the net. This is an aspect that is often referred to being intrinsically "democratic", even thought "egalitarian" is perhaps a better label.
These characteristics are raising some unprecedented problematic dimensions. Here I shall list, on the one hand, some unique general challenges and, on the other hand, some novelties specifically related to democratic ways of governing, foremost parliamentary rule.
General challenges
Among the unprecedented general challenges that the Internet is raising we find the threats of witnesses to these changes, they can choose to strengthen the legislative processes and participatory political engagement.
In the current phase, E-parliamentarization is essentially characterized by the digitization and sharing of documents, the focus is still on the individual act. However, the move that is occurring is a shift of focus from the output of legislation (i.e. acts) to promoting visibility and accessibility of the entire legislative process. The use of information technology opens up new prospects for cooperation, participation and sharing information and knowledge which makes it necessary to shift attention from the single final output (the law) to a more comprehensive approach to law-making, taking into consideration previously unavailable or marginalized information in the process such as amendments, reports, draft laws, the role of committees, legislative inquiries etc.). In other words, the new forms might stress previously hidden dissent.
This approach aims to improve the quality of legal drafting, making these documents clearer, less ambiguous etc. where the presupposition is that more eyes with contrasting interests and preferences examining a text will increase the probability of singling out and pinpointing potential loopholes and equivocality. The type of drafting is also changing:
drafting can now be done in layers. A single piece of legislation thus appears as a normative chain of text versions: texts that modify existing documents, and those that are being modified by it, can be mapped and followed through time (versioning); the logical structure of norms is being captured through languages such as RuleML, and documents are being indexed based on conceptual analysis (ontologies) of its legal domains, and meta-information has been incorporated in documents, including constitutional court decisions or ECJ rulings etc. It is reasonable to assume that such changes will impact on the type, quality, and systematic character of interpretative practices. A challenge here is to assess the rule of law-promoting capacity such procedures may entail.
In the legislation process, citizens rarely have access to the content of legislation until it is in its final stages and can only know about the haggling and negotiating of representatives through the reporting of journalists -this is perhaps about to change. The E-parliament approach that is currently being implemented in many countries also intends to highlight discussions that were not previously available to citizen scrutiny. This does not merely imply increased availability of information but more radically it also shifts emphasis onto previously concealed dissent. In practice this means that accessible documents will not include only the final legislative output as published by official sources, but also other kinds of documentation that is relevant for the formation of the law, yet that has been traditionally kept at the margins of the process with the effect of occulting dissent: think of mark-ups in drafting processes, amendment tracking, parliamentary reports, travaux préparatoires etc. An example of how the digitalization of parliamentary workings is changing practical politics is the role of the motion to amend: often used in parliamentary proceedings to water down a motion into a form that is more likely to be accepted or to convert it into a form that is more likely to be rejected, it can now be used to block the legislative process: the European Parliament enabled its members to submit amendments to bills directly on the web: the amendments are sometimes so many that a blockage of the entire legislative process occurs. Whether for the good or for the bad, it is beyond doubt that ICTs are modifying some parts of the internal workings of representative democracy.
Traditionally, citizens hardly ever look directly at the content of legislation, more often relying on the recycled analysis of pundits who very likely did not read the legislation either. This is another aspect that is liable to change. E-parliament tools also provide for the Add to this the deliberative, participative and direct democratic practices that use ICTs, such as online discussions, online polls, e-petitions, e-consultations on issues and econsultations on bills. ICTs seem to have an impact foremost on "direct democracy institutions" (e.g. citizen initiatives, referendum…), and especially on forms of candidate recruitment (e.g. primaries): "In the United States most of the internet campaigning innovations (…) have occurred during primaries." 85 In particular, we should stress that the most challenging forms of ICTs in politics are those that intend to apply crowdsourcing and wikis for legislative purposes, to attempt to circumvent strong interest groups or corporations.
Recently, Brazil suggested a rather sophisticated "Wikislation" website, e-democracia, as a method of creating web content that could be applied to the legislative process. The idea is to 
